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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 57 APRIL 1959 No. 6 
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING* 
Nathan P. Feinsinger t 
A DISPUTE arose between the company and the employees, ... negotiations were had, largely at the instance of the 
representatives of the employees, ... the negotiations re-
sulted in a settlement of the dispute. Stated thus nakedly, 
this would look like collective bargaining at its best. Yet 
the company filed charges accusing the unions of refusing 
to bargain collectively, the Board issued a complaint pur-
suant to the charges, and issued an order directing the unions 
to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively."1 
In these words, Judges Madden and Fahy, respectively the 
first Chairman and the first General Counsel of the National 
Labor Relations Board, speaking in 1958 as members of the 
United States Court of Appeals, indicated their bewilderment 
at the changes in the meaning of the duty "to bargain collectively" 
which seemed to them to have occurred since the Board's report 
on its first year of operations under the National Labor Relations 
(Wagner) Act2 of 1935. That report stated:3 
"Section 8, subdivision (5), of the act provides that it 
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 'to refuse 
to bargain collectively 1vith the representatives of his em-
• An address delivered at an institute on Collective Bargaining and the Law, The 
University of Michigan Law School, July 31, 1958.-Ed. 
tProfessor of Law, University of Wisconsin.-Ed. 
1 Madden, J., U.S. Court of Claims, sitting as a member of the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals, speaking for the majority (Madden and Fahy) in International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 211 at 214. This 
case denied enforcement to Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957). 
2 49 Stat. 453 (1935). For the early developments, see Smith, "The Evolution of the 
'Duty To Bargain' Concept in American Law," 39 MICH. L. REv. 1065 (1941). For more 
recent developments, see Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HARv. L. REv. 
1401 (1958). 
3 NLRB, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 84-86 (1936). 
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ployees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).' Section 
9(a) of the act provides that: 
" 'Representatives designated or selected for the purposes 
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in 
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, 
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment ... .' 
"Collective bargaining is something more than the mere 
meeting of an employer with the representatives of his em-
ployees; the essential thing is rather the serious intent to 
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground. 
. . . The Board has repeatedly asserted that good faith on the 
part of the employer is an essential ingredient of collective 
bargaining." 
In the context of the Board's first report, the reason for the 
bewilderment· of Judges Madden and Fahy is apparent. In the 
case under consideration, a union, existing for the very purpose 
of bargaining collectively, had been charged with a refusal to 
bargain. In the same case, a party to a labor dispute, seeking to 
negotiate an agreement settling the dispute, had been charged 
with a refusal to bargain because it had used economic pressure, 
not otherwise prohibited by the act, in aid of its bargaining posi-
tion. Were these events, strange though they might have seemed 
in 1935, a proper cause for judicial concern in 1958? 
I. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 adopted 
collective bargaining as a national policy for the prevention and 
settlement of labor disputes. The act was based on the theory 
". . . that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited repre-
sentatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and 
may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act 
in itself does not attempt to compel."4 Acting on that theory, 
Congress imposed on employers the duty "to bargain collec-
tively."5 In the 1947 amendments to the act,6 Congress undertook 
4 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 at 45 (1937). 
5 Section 8(5) of the original NLRA, note 2 supra, carried for-ward in §8(a)(5) of the 
act as amended in 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(5). 
6 Labor-Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 
(1952) §151 et seq. (hereinafter cited LMRA). 
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to define the duty7 and extended it to unions.8 What did Congress 
mean by "collective bargaining?" How closely have the decisions of 
the National Labor Relations Board and the reviewing courts 
conformed to that meaning? Do those decisions support the 
Board's recent statement that " ... our duty under the Act is ... 
to determine whether the obligation of good faith bargaining has 
been met rather than to establish ideal bargaining conditions?"9 
In the view of the Supreme Court, Congress had in mind "the 
philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement 
in the United States."10 According to that philosophy, collective 
bargaining is viewed as essentially a voluntary process from its 
inception. By imposing a legal duty to bargain, Congress itself 
departed, in a sense, from that basic philosophy. The "majority 
rule,"11 by which statutory bargaining is confined to dealings 
between an employer and a union representing a majority of his 
employees, is a further departure. That rule, moreover, conflicts 
with one of the stated objectives of the act itself, namely, "the stabi-
lization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within 
and between industries."12 If a majority of the employees in a 
part of an industry, for example, vote against union represen-
tation, a union which represents other employees in the industry 
is effectively blocked from pursuing the stated objective. The 
194 7 amendments go even farther in regulating, to some extent, 
both the subject matter13 and procedure14 of bargaining, and in 
7 Section 8(d) provides that " ... to ,bargain collectively is the performance of the 
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms 
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party 
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. • . ." Emphasis added. 
s Section 8(b)(3) of the amended act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice 
for a labor organization or its agents-"to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, 
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 
9(a)." The latter section-9(a)-is quoted in the text at note 3. 
9 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., 118 NL.R.B. 1055 at 1061 (1957). 
10 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 at 
346 (1944). Quoted with approval in NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 
at 408 (1952). 
11 LMRA, §9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(a). 
12 LMRA, §1, "Findings and Policies," 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §151. 
13 For example, the employer and the union can no longer negotiate a "closed 
shop" agreement. LMRA, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3). 
14 For example, a union must give 60 days notice of its intent to terminate or modify 
a contract. LMRA, §8(d)(l), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d)(l). 
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limiting the economic weapons which a union may use in seeking 
to establish collective bargaining or in attaining its customary 
objectives thereafter.15 
These departures from "the philosophy of bargaining as 
worked out in the labor movement in the United States" repre-
sent a proper exercise of judgment on the part of Congress in 
weighing the values of "free" collective bargaining against its 
own notions of "sound" or "ideal" bargaining. Within the limits 
thus established, the Board was soon called upon to administer 
the 1935 act in a variety of situations, out of which it evolved 
the basic test of "good faith" bargaining. Pre-1947 decisions apply-
ing this test were presumably approved by Congress as part of 
the 194 7 amendments in undertaking to define the duty to bargain 
collectively and in adopting "good faith" as the keystone of that 
definition.16 
IL "Gooo F Arra'" BARGAINING 
In endorsing collective bargaining as a national policy, Con-
gress sought to eliminate certain sources of industrial unrest, 
to remedy the inequality of bargaining power between employers 
and individual employees, to increase mass purchasing power 
through increased wage levels, and to eliminate competitive 
advantages based on differentials in wage rates and working con-
ditions within and between industries.17 These objectives were to 
be met by encouraging the growth of strong unions and by 
requiring the employer "to bargain collectively." 
The meaning of the duty "to bargain collectively" must be 
related to these objectives. One source of industrial unrest was 
employer interference with self-organization of employees and 
refusal to meet with unions freely chosen by them as their repre-
sentatives for the purposes of collective bargaining. A definition 
of the duty to bargain which would require the employer to 
adopt a "hands off" attitude and simply to meet with the union 
to listen to its proposals would largely solve this problem. But 
such a narrow definition would not remove another kind of 
15 For example, the union cannot resort to a secondary boycott in some situations. 
LMRA, §8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(b)(4). 
16 LMRA, §B(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d). 
17 Note 12 supra. 
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threat to industrial peace, namely, strikes, lockouts and other 
forms of economic disturbance resulting from disagreements over 
wages, hours or working conditions. Congress was concerned with 
that problem also, and recognized that a broader definition of the 
duty to bargain was required to solve it. Thus, Congress sought 
to eliminate obstructions to commerce "by encouraging the prac-
tice and procedure of collective bargaining," that is, "practices 
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes 
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working 
conditions."18 Obviously, if the employer were to be obliged 
to follow such practices, a merely passive attitude at the bargain-
ing table would not suffice. To discharge his duty in good faith, 
he would have to approach the bargaining table with a sincere 
desire to reach agreement on the issues in dispute and to make a 
reasonable effort toward that end. A reasonable effort would 
include a willingness to explain his objections to the union's 
proposals, to make counterproposals, and in general to act like 
one who meant to do business rather than merely to go through 
the motions. Good faith bargaining, by any definition, would 
require at least that much.19 
There is, of course, some risk of confusing what Congress 
hoped that good faith bargaining would accomplish with what it 
intended to require, by imposing the duty to bargain. If all the 
stated objectives of the act were to be read into the duty to 
bargain, it would follow that an employer would be required 
to make concessions in order, for example, to raise the general 
level of wages or to eliminate differentials in w.ages or working 
conditions. From the very outset, however, the Board made it 
clear that the duty to bargain did not require the making of con-
cessions,20 and this position was expressly approved by Congress 
in 1947 in adopting section S(d).21 The duty to make counterpro-
posals, as contrasted with concessions, is still considered as an 
element of good faith bargaining.22 
lSibid. 
19 The employer must "make some reasonable effort in some direction to compose 
his differences with the union, if §8(a)(5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obliga-
tion at all." NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., (1st Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 131 at 134-135, 
cert. den. 346 U.S. 887 (1953). 
20See Matter of The Sands Mfg. Co., I N.L,R.B. 546 (1936). 
21 See note 7 supra. 
22 See discussion in Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HARv. L. REv. 
1401 at 1421 (1958). 
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III. CHANGES IN THE MEANING OF "Goon FAITH" 
BARGAINING-EVOLUTION OF THE PER SE RULE 
Most of the cases coming before the Board on a section 8(5) 
or 8(a)(5) charge have been, or could have been, decided by 
applying a simple test of good faith, namely, whether the evidence 
revealed a lack of sincere desire and reasonable effort to reach an 
agreement, or, as sometimes stated, a desire to avoid coming 
to agreement.23 Early in its history, however, the Board began 
to find violations of the act in situations where that simple test 
does not wholly explain the result. Such situations include refusal 
to sign a written agreement, unilateral changes in wages or other 
conditions of employment, and refusal to furnish information 
relating to the statutory subjects of bargaining. 
In H. ]. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,24 decided in 1941, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the Board that an employer's refusal to sign 
a writing embodying the results of negotiations constituted a 
violation of section 8(5). Describing a signed agreement as "the 
final step in the bargaining process," the court reasoned that 
failure to recognize the role of the union in that step "impairs 
the bargaining process" and "tends to frustrate the aim of . . . 
industrial peace through collective bargaining."25 
Collective bargaining implies acceptance of the role of the 
union as a joint participant in the establishment of employment 
standards. Participation is not complete if the union is excluded 
from the ":final step" of confirming the agreement reached, in 
the form of a signed agreement. This reasoning is sufficient to 
support the Heinz decision. Moreover, as the court pointed out, 
at the time Congress adopted section 8(5), it had before it decisions 
issued under section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act 
of 1933,26 supporting the requirement of a signed agreement, 
which decisions Congress presumably meant to approve. Any 
question on that specific point was settled when Congress adopted 
such a requirement as part of section 8(d).27 The significance of 
the Heinz case is that its language, whether or not necessary to 
23 See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., (1st Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 131 at 134, cert. 
den. 346 U.S. 887 (1953). 
24 311 U.S. 514 (1941). 
25 Id. at 523-526. 
26 48 Stat. 198. 
21 Note 7 supra. 
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the decision, laid the foundation for the view that "good faith" 
bargaining requires more than willingness to reach an agreement; 
that it also condemns conduct, whether or not supported by pre-
Wagner Act practice, which the Board may reasonably find to 
be in conflict with the basic objective of the act, namely, the 
promotion of industrial peace. 
The broad language of the Supreme Court in the Heinz case 
presented the Board with a dilemma. Congress sought to prevent 
industrial unrest but did not prohibit it. In evaluating a par-
ticular course of conduct, the Board was obliged to heed both 
propositions. What kinds of conduct were to be prescribed by the 
Board under the court's formula, other than conduct made illegal 
by the act or clearly contrary to its expressed policy? Was the 
Board itself to establish standards of "sound," "fair" or "ideal" 
bargaining? If so, where was it to find those standards? Would 
failure to meet those standards constitute a per se violation of 
section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3), or create a prima facie case, subject 
to rebuttal, or simply constitute evidence of bad faith to be 
considered in the context of the employer's total conduct? To 
what extent would such standards be subject to judicial review? 
A. Unilateral Action-R. L. White v. NLRB28 
The representatives chosen by the employees are by law the 
"exclusive" representatives for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining.29 An employer's unilateral action, prior to an impasse 
in negotiations, with regard to wages or other subjects of bargain-
ing, without prior notice to or consultation with the union, 
violates this principle. The practical objection to such action 
is that it suggests to employees that there is no need for a union, 
and at the very least weakens the union's bargaining position. 
In White's Uvalde Mines,80 the Board recently held that an 
employer had violated the provisions of section 8(a)(l)81 and 
(5) by granting unilateral merit wage increases after certification 
of a union and before negotiations had commenced, without notice 
28 (5th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 564. 
29 LMRA, §9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(a). See text above at note 3. 
80 117 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1957). 
81 Section 8(a)(l) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, 
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7," which 
include the right to self-organization and to bargain collectively. 
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to or discussion with the union. Although there were findings 
of other violations of those provisions as well, the Board found 
that the unilateral action constituted an independent violation, 
stating: "Such conduct not only tends to undermine the Union's 
authority as the employees' exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative, but also reflects adversely on the Respondent's good 
faith in the ensuing negotiations.''32 The Board stated further: 
"Moreover, we find that, even if there were some economic 
justification for the haste, this does not excuse the Respondent's 
failure to perform its statutory duty owing to its employees' 
certified representative."33 
Perhaps a per se rule in such a situation is justified in the 
interest of administrative convenience and as affording a certain 
guide for the parties. After all, it does not take much time to 
call some official of a union on the phone. The wisdom of going 
beyond establishing a rebuttable presumption may, however, be 
questioned. Suppose X, a steel fabricator or auto parts manufac-
turer who has always settled with the local union on the basis of 
the "pattern" of wage increases established by the steel producing 
or auto manufacturing industry and their unions, has reached 
agreement with the local on all issues but wages. The local has 
not yet agreed to settle for the pattern but all indications are 
that it will do so, although the question of retroactivity may 
present a problem. The labor market is tight, and some of the 
key employees of X are irked at his delay in granting a wage 
increase, with retroactivity still uncertain. On the day of the 
steel or auto wage settlement, X can find no authorized union 
official to notify of his intent to place the same wage increase into 
effect, with full retroactivity. Such a case illustrates the difficulty 
with a per se rule in this area, and perhaps in any area of 
bargaining. 
In R. L. White v. NLRB34 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit reversed the Board's holding as to the unilateral merit 
increases, rejecting the Board's per se rule, and upholding the 
granting of the increases on the ground that they "were simply 
in line with ... custom and practice" of the employer. The court's 
reasoning on the latter point is questionable. Once a union is 
32117 NL.R.B. 1128 at 1129 (1957). Emphasis added. 
33 Id. at 1129, n. 6. 
34 (5th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 564. 
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certified, continuing a past practice of individual bargaining 
undermines its status as exclusive bargaining representative. The 
suggestion of the court of appeals that an employer may continue 
such a practice until negotiations begin, despite prior certification 
of the union, appears to have no foundation in law.35 
The White case involves another aspect of unilateral action and 
its relation to the duty to bargain, which has considerable practical 
significance. The problem stems from NLRB v. American 
National Insurance Co.,36 holding that the extent to which a 
contract should fix standards of employment is "a condition of 
employment to be settled by bargaining."37 In the latter case, 
the employer refused to agree to any settlement which did not 
include a "management prerogative" clause reserving unilateral 
control over promotions, discipline and work schedules. The 
union was willing to accept the clause provided that grievances 
questioning the fairness of the employer's actions in the exercise 
of his reserved rights could be taken to arbitration. The employer 
rejected the arbitration proposal. During negotiations, the em-
ployer made unilateral changes in certain employment condi-
tions included in the proposed clause, without consulting the 
union. The Board held that both the insistence on the proposed 
clause and the unilateral action violated section 8(a)(5). The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the unilateral 
action was improper, but held that the employer could properly 
insist on the proposed clause, approving the Trial Examiner's 
view that this was simply a case of "hard bargaining" and his 
assertion that "Economic strength is still the underlying touch-
stone of success at the bargaining table." The Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the Board had erred (1) in its per 
se approach, (2) in attempting to "sit in judgment upon the 
substantive terms" of the agreement,38 and (3) in overlooking 
the fact that under "the philosophy of collective bargaining as 
worked out in the labor movement in the United States,"39 em-
ployers and unions frequently agree to "management prerogative" 
clauses. Justices Minton, Black and Douglas dissented, agreeing 
35 See the cases discussed by Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith,'' 71 HARv. 
L. R.Ev. 1401 at 1423-1425 (1958). 
36 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
37 Id. at 409. 
38 Id. at 404. 
39 Id. at 408. See note IO supra. 
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with the Board that insistence on, as contrasted with a mere 
proposal for, unilateral control over any statutory subject of 
bargaining is tantamount to a refusal to bargain on that subject, 
and a per se violation of the act. 
To the extent that the American National Insurance Co. 
holding is based on pre-Wagner Act practice, it is questionable. 
Previously, the union had no legally enforceable right to insist 
on anything; its sole resort was to economic force. The National 
Labor Relations Act, imposing on the employer the legal duty 
to bargain on "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or 
other conditions of employment" changes the picture. The duty 
to bargain includes the obligation to recognize the role of the 
union as a joint participant in the establishment of employment 
standards. By insisting on a management prerogative clause cover-
ing statutory subjects of bargaining the employer seeks to with-
hold such recognition. The employer may properly propose such 
a clause, but it is difficult to see how the union may be forced 
to accept the proposal and thereby surrender a statutory right, 
as the price of an agreement. There is no real distinction between 
an employer's refusal to agree to any standard to govern working 
schedules, for example, and a refusal to consummate an agree-
ment unless the union agrees to the removal of that subject from 
the bargaining table. Pre-Wagner Act practice is not in point, 
because under that practice the employer was legally free to take 
either position. There is no basis for inferring that Congress 
intended to prevent him from taking one position but not 
the other. 
The court's criticism of the Board's approach as an attempt 
to pass judgment on the reasonableness of the employer's proposal 
is likewise open to question. As the court viewed it, the Board 
was attempting to require the employer to make a "concession," 
in disregard of the express language of section 8(d). This criti-
cism would be valid if the employer had proposed a particular 
standard for a work schedule, for example, which the Board con-
demned as unreasonable on the merits. In the case in question, 
however, the employer had proposed that it have complete discre-
tion on the subject, which means no standard at all. By its holding, 
the Board was not requiring a "concession," but was simply requir-
ing the employer to recognize the union's right to full joint partic-
ipation with management in the establishment and promulgation 
of standards of employment, which the court in the Heinz case 
1959] NLRA AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 817 
had treated as an essential element in the collective bargaining 
process. 
In the White case, the employer insisted on a clause which, 
taken together with other demands, amounted to a complete 
reservation of control over all standards of employment. The 
employer demanded a "no-strike" clause while refusing to agree 
to an arbitration clause. In addition, the employer promised wage 
increases in return for help in destroying the union, and, after 
a protest strike, made promises and threats designed to break 
the strike. This led to a Board finding that "at the time the 
Respondent was meeting with the union it was also seeking to 
destroy it." The Board concluded that the employer had violated 
not only section 8(a)(l) but also 8(a)(5). The court of appeals, 
with Judge Rives dissenting, disagreed as to the section 8(a)(5) 
violation. 
As the Board saw the facts, the employer had simply offered 
a signed document with no substance. In its view, the proposed 
contract would leave the employees worse off than without any 
contract, since in the latter case, the employer could not unilater-
ally change the conditions of employment over which he sought 
to reserve unilateral control. The court, however, was not im-
pressed with the argument. In its opinion, the Board had simply 
proceeded on the erroneous theory that the duty to bargain 
requires the employer to concede something substantial, though 
section 8( d) expressly provides the contrary, and had ignored the 
American National Insurance Co. decision, under which the 
extent of union participation in the establishment of standards 
of employment is itself a "condition of employment" and therefore 
a proper subject of collective bargaining. 
The White case is distinguishable from American National 
Insurance Co. in at least one respect. In the former case, the 
Board found that the ·employer was attempting to destroy the 
union. The court apparently agreed, but treated this fact as im-
material to the issue of refusal to bargain because the Board 
had not linked its section 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) findings. At most, 
however, this technical defeat warranted remand to the Board, 
as the Supreme Court would probably hold. The more difficult 
question is whether the Supreme Court would find it possible to 
distinguish between insistence on a reservation of unilateral con-
trol over some subjects of bargaining, as in the American National 
Insurance Co. case, and all or virtually all such subjects, as in the 
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White case.30a If the court should adhere to its criterion of "the 
philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor ·movement 
in the United States," such a distinction would be questionable. 
It would not be difficult to find many instances in pre-Wagner 
Act practice of unions willing to settle, particularly in negotiations 
for a first contract, for a skeleton agreement, perhaps one con-
taining nothing but a recognition clause. But again, a practice 
existing when no legal duty to bargain existed seems inapposite 
under a law imposing a duty to bargain and setting forth certain 
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The duty to bargain collectively 
would seem to include the obligation to attempt to negotiate 
the kind of agreement which would have a stabilizing effect on 
industrial relations. A skeleton contract does not have that effect. 
This is the principle on which the Board rejects such contracts 
as a bar to an employees' petition to change bargaining represent-
atives, 40 a doctrine which may be presumed to have the approval 
of Congress. Applying that criterion, R. L. White v. NLRB41 was 
wrongly decided. 
B. The Duty To Furnish Information-the Truitt Case42 
Does good faith bargaining obligate either party to lend 
affirmative assistance to the other in the bargaining process? 
The Board has held, with the approval of the reviewing courts, 
that "An employer's duty to bargain includes the obligation to 
furnish the bargaining representative with sufficient information 
to enable it to bargain intelligently, to understand and discuss 
the issues raised by the employer in opposition to the union's 
demands, and to administer a contract."43 The doctrine has been 
applied to a number of wage matters such as merit increases, job 
rates, job classifications and the operation of incentive systems.44 
It appears to apply although the employer is otherwise making 
39a Compare Cummer-Graham Co., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1959). 
40 "The Board has consistently denied contract-bar effect to an agreement which does 
not contain substantive terms and conditions of employment and thus does not stabilize 
the labor-management relationship and encourage industrial peace." NLRB TWENTY· 
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1957). 
41 (5th Cir. 1928) 255 F. (2d) 564. 
42 Truitt Mfg. Co., llO N.L:R.B. 856 (1954), enf. den. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., (4th 
Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 869, revd. 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
43 See NLRB SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 172 (1953). 
44 See Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 at 1425-
1428 (1958). 
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a good faith effort to reach an agreement and has stated his 
business reasons for declining the information. 
A good deal may be said for the Board's doctrine in terms of 
sound labor relations. One who plays his cards close to his chest 
provokes suspicion as to his motive and invites reprisals. To 
illustrate, a union having received complaints from its constituents 
that the employer's system of merit increases has been arbitrarily 
administered asks for information on which to assess the com-
plaints. The employer refuses, on the ground that such informa-
tion is confidential, but seeks to assure the union that the system 
is being fairly administered. Thus rebuffed, the union may feel 
it has no alternative but to demand the abolition of the system. 
The employer may resist. The impasse may result in an unneces-
sary strike. The question remains, however, whether it is proper 
for the Board to find the employer guilty of a refusal to bargain 
if he should choose to assume this risk.45 
The general rule requiring the employer to furnish informa-
tion concerning the subjects of bargaining does not depend on 
how the matter becomes an issue. The rule is qualified, however, 
when the information requested relates to the employer's financial 
ability to grant a proposed wage increase. If he should raise tlie 
issue by pleading inability to pay as the basis for denying the 
increase, he must, according to the Board's Truitt doctrine, "sub-
stantiate his position by reasonable proof." The rule does not 
apply, however, according to the Board's recent decision in Pine 
Industrial Relations Committee, Inc./6 if the employer does not 
plead inability to, pay as the basis for rejecting a wage proposal. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with 
the Board's description of its Truitt doctrine as "settled law." The 
court reasoned that unlike ordinary wage data, the data which 
the employer would be compelled to supply in a case like Truitt 
would include confidential information, namely, dividends, man-
ufacturing costs, and other "matters altogether in the province of 
management." The Supreme Court appears to have rejected this 
reasoning. In sustaining the Board's order, it stated:47 
45 Compare Cox, id. at 1428: "In virtually all the cases, except those involving 
financial data, there could be no negotiation on the subject, in any sense of the term, 
until the information was supplied to the union." 
46 llB N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957), affd. Intl. Woodworkers v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1959) 43 
L.R.R.M. 2462. 
47 351 U.S. 149 at 152-153 (1956). 
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"Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims 
made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is 
true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. 
If such an argument is important enough to present in the 
give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require 
some sort of proof of its accuracy." 
The majority of the court questioned the Board's per se view,48 
but pointed to no particular facts other than the refusal to furnish 
the information requested which might have demonstrated bad 
faith. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting with Justices Clark and 
Harlan, was of the view that refusal to substantiate a claim of 
inability to pay constitutes a "weighty item" of evidence of bad 
faith, but felt that the case should have been remanded to the 
Board to consider the totality of the employer's conduct, including 
"the previous relations of the parties, antecedent events explain-
ing behavior at the bargaining table, and the course of nego-
tiations. "49 The statement by the majority of the Supreme Court 
that good faith bargaining requires "honest claims" has consider-
able appeal, if the Board is to concern itself with bargaining 
morals. Even in that case, the suggested rule would be difficult to 
administer. Suppose an employer claims he can afford to pay only 
three cents of the ten cents per hour increase demanded by the 
union and furnishes financial information in an attempt to sup-
port his claim. The Board, on analyzing the information, con-
cludes that he can clearly afford to pay ten cents, or something 
more than three cents. Would the employer be subject to a 
section 8(a)(5) charge? .Or, suppose a union demands a union 
shop agreement on the ground that the employer is "anti-union," 
but refuses to substantiate its claim. Would the union be subject 
to a section 8(b)(3) charge? 
Ability to pay is an elastic principle. Its application in any 
case involves some degree of subjective judgment. Its application 
in a particular case may depend on the employer's business pre-
dictions and plans which he should not be required, as a matter of 
law, to justify to the union. To illustrate the point, one need only 
48 Id. at 153-154: "We do not hold •.• that in every case in which economic 
inability is raised as an argument against increased •wages it automatically follows that 
the employees are entitled ,to substantiating evidence. . • • The inquiry must always 
-be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation 
to ·bargain in good faith has been met." 
49 Id. at 155. 
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refer to the recurrent conflict between the Steelworkers and the 
Basic Steel Industry as to the latter's ability to absorb the cost of 
a wage increase without a price increase. The same conflict has 
occurred between the government and the Steel and other indus-
tries in periods of economic controls, despite the existence of 
official wage and price increase criteria. Again, in a case like Truitt, 
the "honest claims" doctrine may actually discourage honest 
claims and encourage dishonest ones. Faced with the alternative of 
"opening the books" so that the union or a third party might 
formulate a judgment as to the employer's financial position, 
the employer may decide not to advance the claim of inability 
to pay, taking refuge instead in other claims, or simply taking 
an adamant position on wages, thus risking a strike. Or, rather 
than risk a strike, he may decide to grant an increase which he is 
convinced is not justified by the economic facts of the case, includ-
ing his profit position, thus being forced indirectly to make a 
concession on wages which he could not be forced to make 
directly. 
For the reasons suggested, refusal to furnish financial infor-
mation to support a plea of inability to pay as the basis for deny-
ing a wage increase should not be regarded as a per se refusal to 
bargain in good faith, or even as a "weighty item" of evidence 
of bad faith. Its relevancy as well as its weight should depend 
on all the circumstances of the particular case bearing on the 
employer's state of mind. 
Truitt was followed by Pine Industrial Relations Committee, 
Inc.,50 in which the union requested members of an employer's 
association to supply various items of information expressly in 
order to "formulate constructive proposals for intelligent collective 
bargaining." The data requested included figures showing annual 
board foot production and related sales totals expressed in dollars. 
Each employer refused to supply such information, claiming 
that it would handicap him competitively. The Trial Examiner 
found that the requested information was relevant and necessary 
for the purpose of collective bargaining and should have been 
supplied. The Board, interpreting the union's position as a request 
for financial information to support a claim of ability to pay, 
dismissed the complaint. In the Board's view, the Truitt doctrine 
applies only when the employer has raised the issue of ability to 
50 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957). See note 45 supra. 
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pay by pleading inability as the basis for refusing a wage increase, 
whereas here the employers had expressly disclaimed such a plea. 
Member Murdock dissented, on the ground that the data requested 
related to "productivity" rather than to ability to pay. In his 
view, productivity is a most appropriate criterion for wage in-
creases, one repeatedly endorsed by the Administration; therefore, 
the information should have been supplied. 
In all likelihood, the Board will sooner or later be confronted 
with a case in which the union demands a wage increase of an 
employer on the ground that the productivity of his employees has 
increased since the last previous negotiations; therefore, regardless 
of the employer's profit position or ability to pay, the demand 
should be granted. In such a case, would the Board require the 
employer to furnish productivity information to the union at its 
request? If the employer should deny that productivity has 
-increased and on that basis refuse to grant a wage demand, pre-
sumably the Truitt doctrine would apply. But suppose he does 
not make such a denial, or seek to justify his rejection of the 
wage demand on that basis. Does Truitt control? Is there any 
basis for distinguishing information relating to productivity and 
information relating to ability to pay so as to require the employer 
to provide productivity data in such a case, regardless of how 
the issue is raised? 
Several possible distinctions may be considered. Productivity 
is a measure of the worth of the services of the work force, whereas 
ability to pay is not. Productivity is regarded by employers and 
unions alike as a relevant criterion in most cases, whereas ability 
or inability to pay is emphasized by the party more likely to 
benefit by its use as a criterion in a particular case. Productivity 
information relates to unit labor costs, which can be determined 
largely by objective standards, without disclosure of "confidential" 
information, and without necessarily involving management in 
a debate with the union as to the employer's business policies or 
prospects. This does not mean that the furnishing of information 
on unit labor costs will foreclose debate. There will often be dis-
agreement as to what part of the decrease in such costs, if any, 
is due to improved performance by the employees and what 
part to management's efforts, how the resulting benefits should be 
distributed among the employees, stockholders, and the public, 
and so on. At the very least, however, the parties will have a 
starting point for intelligent and constructive bargaining on the 
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vital subject of wage increases, assuming such a consideration to 
be relevant to the issue of good faith bargaining. 
C. Union Refusal To Bargain-The Boone County Case51 
The Board's statement in Pine Industrial Relations Committee, 
Inc., that " ... our duty under the Act is to determine whether 
the obligation of good faith bargaining has been met rather than 
to establish ideal bargaining conditions"52 is questionable in the 
light of the foregoing discussion of cases involving charges of 
employer refusal to bargain. It is open to further question in the 
light of recent cases involving charges of union refusal to bargain. 
In 1947, by adopting section 8(b)(3), Congress subjected unions 
to a duty to bargain, stated and defined in the same terms as the 
employer's duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5). The legislative 
history of section 8(b )(3) discloses that . Congress was concerned 
partly with what it believed to be the economic power of some 
unions to force agreements on employers by a "take it or leave it" 
attitude. The immediate cause for concern was the wave of post-
war strikes by unions in the basic mass-producing industries. 
Various proposals were considered to curb the economic power 
of such unions, but in the end the right to strike was confirmed, 
subject to a few specific restrictions.53 
In Phelps-Dodge Copper Products Corp.,54 the employer was 
charged with a violation of section 8(a)(5) by refusing to negotiate 
with the union during a slowdown, which was designed to bring 
pressure on the employer to accept the union's terms. A slow-
down had previously been held to be a form of unprotected "con-
certed activity" under the act, 55 meaning that an employer who 
disciplined employees for such conduct could not be charged with 
51 Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enf. den. International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 211. 
52 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., 118 N.L,R.B. 1055 at 1061 (1957). 
53 Section 13 of the amended NLRA provides: "Nothing in this Act, except as specifi-
cally provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or 
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on 
that right." Section 501(2) of the LMRA provides: "T'he term 'strike' includes any strike 
or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the 
expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other 
concerted interruption of operations by employees." Section 8(b)(4) of the amended 
NLRA prohibits certain types of secondary boycotts. 
54 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952). 
55 Section 7 of the NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in "concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 
Section 8(a)(l) prohibits employer interference with such activities. 
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an unfair labor practice. In Phelps-Dodge the Board, defining the 
issue as "one of first impression," found the employer not in vio-
lation of section 8(a)(5) because of the absence of "fair dealing" 
on the part of the union. In its view, the union had "engaged 
in a harrassing tactic irreconcilable with the Act's requirement of 
reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bargaining rela-
tions upon which good-faith bargaining must rest."56 In the 
Personal Products case57 the Board, citing Phelps-Dodge, took 
the next step of holding that similar unprotected "harrassing 
tactics" for the same purpose not only suspended the employer's 
duty to bargain, but constituted a violation of the union's affirm-
ative duty to bargain under section 8(a)(3). The policy of collective 
bargaining, the Board said, is 
" ... neither furthered nor effectuated when an employer 
or a union so exercises its bargaining powers as to thwart 
or impair the bargaining process, which requires for its 
furtherance cooperation in the give and take of personal 
conferences, with a willingness to let ultimate decision follow 
a fair opportunity for presentation of opposing views, argu-
ments, and positions .... We think it clear that such unpro-
tected harrassing tactics were an abuse of the Union's bar-
gaining powers-'irreconcilable with the Act's requirement 
of reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bar-
gaining relations upon which good-faith bargaining must 
rest' -which impaired the process of collective bargaining that 
Congress intended not only to encourage but to protect."58 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to 
enforce the Board's order. In its view, there is no inconsistency 
"between genuine desire to come to an agreement and use of 
economic pressure to get the kind of agreement one wants."59 
If a total strike for that purpose is permissible, so, in the court's 
view, should be a partial strike. It is immaterial that the tactics 
used might justify the employer in discharging the participants 
on the ground that their activity was "unprotected" under section 
7 of the act. Engaging in such activity is not equivalent to a refusal 
to bargain. 
56101 NL.R.B. 360 at 368 (1952). Emphasis added. 
57 Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforced in 
part, set aside in part, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 
227 F. (2d) 409. 
58108 NLR.B. 743 at 745-747 (1954). 
59 Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 409 at 410. 
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The Board's requirement of "reasoned discussion" as a factor 
in good faith bargaining is, of course, not new. If, as the Board 
found, the union failed even to specify the demands which it 
sought to enforce by its tactics, the case could have been disposed 
of on the basis of that simple requirement. But the finding was 
relied on only as the basis for a "moreover" argument. The 
Board's assertion, however, that good faith bargaining requires 
a "background of balanced bargaining relations" and "fair 
dealing," is difficult to reconcile with its more recent disclaimer 
of any obligation to esta.blish "ideal" bargaining relations.60 
If "balanced bargaining relations" suggests a duty on the part 
of an employer or a union to exercise restraint in the use of its 
superior economic strength to obtain a favorable settlement, the 
Board has quite clearly added something to the basic philosophy 
of the collective bargaining process. The Board's reliance on the 
Heinz decision, which condemns a refusal to sign a written agree-
ment on the ground that such conduct "impairs the bargaining 
process," is questionable, for such conduct reflects an unwillingness 
to permit the union to participate in the "final step" of confirming 
agreed standards; moreover, the rule of the Heinz case has been 
expressly approved by Congress. The Board's reliance on the 
American National Insurance Co. decision of the Supreme Court 
is also questionable, since the Board was reversed for the very 
reason that it had undertaken, in the court's view, to evaluate 
the conduct of the parties in the collective bargaining process. 
Similar attempts on the part of the Board to require "fair 
dealing" on the part of the union as a part of the collective 
bargaining process have likewise been frowned upon by the courts. 
In the Boone County Coal Corp. case,61 the Board equated a 
strike in breach of contract with "harrassing tactics," as a viola-
tion of the union's duty to bargain. In that case, the contract 
contained a seniority clause and a provision for arbitration of 
grievances. The union struck in a dispute over the application of 
the seniority clause, an arbitrable issue. The Board found that 
the agreement to arbitrate implied an agreement not to strike 
over such an issue, from which it would follow that the strike 
constituted a breach of contract. In the Board's view such a strike, 
60 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957). 
61 Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enf. den. International Union, 
United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 211. 
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occurring in a "bargaining context," constituted a violation of 
section 8(b)(3). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
disagreed with the finding of an implied no-strike agreement. 
This would have been sufficient to dispose of the case. A majority 
of the court, however, felt impelled to query the Board's con-
ception of the collective bargaining process, saying:62 
"The foregoing recital shows that a dispute arose between 
the company and the employees, that negotiations were had, 
largely at the instance of representatives of the employees, 
that the negotiations resulted in a settlement of the dispute. 
Stated thus nakedly, this would look like collective bargaining 
at its best .... " 
IV. SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING-THE BORG-WARNER CASE63 
The opinions in the recent five-to-four decision of the Supreme 
Court in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp. 
further illustrate the difficulties to be anticipated in departing 
from the simple criterion of a sincere effort to reach an agree-
ment resolving a labor dispute as the test of "good faith" bar-
gaining. In that case, despite the fact he was acting in good faith 
in all other respects, the employer was found to have violated 
his duty to bargain by insisting on certain proposals as a condition 
of agreement. One such proposal was a "recognition" clause 
naming the local union as the bargaining representative, though 
the international union had been certified. The second was a 
clause requiring, in part, that all employees in the bargaining unit, 
whether members of the union or not, vote by secret ballot on 
the employer's last offer before the union could call a strike. These 
proposals were part of a "package" settlement otherwise acceptable 
to the union. The Board found that the employer's insistence 
on either proposed clause to the point of impasse, by making its 
acceptance a condition of any agreement, violated section 8(a)(5). 
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that insistence on 
the first proposal violated section 8(a)(5) of the act since it con-
flicted directly with the duty to bargain with the representative 
selected by the employees. The majority also reasoned that the 
62 Id. at 214. 
63 113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955), enforced in part (6th Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 898, revd. in 
part 356 U.S.C. 342 (1958). 
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proposal did not relate to any of the "statutory" or "mandatory" 
subjects of bargaining listed in section 9(a)-"rates of pay, wages, 
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment" -
therefore the employer could not press the proposal to the point 
of impasse. On this latter reasoning, the majority of the court, 
in an opinion by Justice Burton, held that insistence on the second 
proposar was also a violation of section 8(a)(5). Justice Frank-
furter, in one opinion, and Justice Harlan, in another, speaking 
also for Justices Clark and Whittaker, dissented. 
The majority opinion interprets the duty to bargain as 
permitting either party to advance any proposal which is not 
illegal or contrary to the policies of the act, but as prohibiting 
the party making the proposal from (I) requiring that the other 
party bargain thereon, or (2) making its acceptance a condition 
of an agreement, if the proposal does not relate to one of the 
"statutory" or "mandatory" subjects of bargaining, i.e., those 
listed in section 9(a). An employer who insists on a proposal con-
cerning a mere "permissive" or "voluntary" subject of bargaining 
violates section 8(a)(3), because he thereby refuses to bargain on 
the "mandatory" or "statutory" subjects even though, in fact, 
agreement has been reached on all such latter subjects. A proposal 
by an employer for a vote by all employees in the bargaining unit 
falls in the former category, because (I) it settles no condition of 
employment, but calls for a mere advisory opinion of the em-
ployees; (2) unlike the customary "no-strike" clause, the pro-
posed clause prohibits strikes after as well as during the life of 
the contract; (3) the proposed clause attempts to regulate the 
procedure to be followed in rejecting a last offer or in calling a 
strike, which is a matter to be decided solely between the union 
and the employees it represents, and not the concern of the 
employer; (4) the proposed clause undercuts the status of the 
union as bargaining representative by enabling the employer to 
deal directly with his employees. 
Justice Frankfurter, remarking on "the rather vague scope 
of the obligatory provisions of section 8(d)" would make the 
distinction turn on whether a particular clause was "clearly 
outside the reasonable range of industrial bargaining." By this 
test, he would uphold the clause proposed by the employer in 
this case. He does not suggest an objective test to determine 
"reasonable range." Presumably, he would leave the question to 
the Board in the first instance, subject to judicial review. 
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The dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan emphasizes the 
following objections to the majority holding: 
1. The no-strike clause proposed, no less than the usual no-
strike clause, determines when employees may strike. Both types 
of clauses are therefore "conditions of employment," hence both 
are statutory subjects of bargaining. 
2. By listing the subjects on which one must bargain, Congress 
did not mean to preclude bargaining on other subjects. Assuming 
that the proposed clause was not a statutory subject of bargaining, 
that relieved the union of any obligation to bargain on it. But it 
does not follow that by insisting on the proposal, the employer 
violated its affirmative duty to bargain. Granted that the superior 
economic power of the employer might, in practical effect, compel 
the union to bargain, this is immaterial, since Congress never 
intended the Board to "exercise its powers to aid a party ... 
which was in an economically disadvantageous position." 
3. Congress regarded collective bargaining as a :flexible and 
evolving process. New types of proposals are constantly being 
made. The distinction between proposing and insisting on non-
statutory matters, besides being unrealistic, is difficult to observe. 
Fear of overstepping the line and thereby inviting a charge of 
refusal to bargain will inhibit the making of such proposals 
altogether, thereby stultifying the bargaining process. 
4. Insistence on some non-statutory proposals "might in the 
context of a particular industry be so extreme as to constitute 
some evidence of unwillingness to bargain." But this was not 
such a proposal, since simil~r clauses had been negotiated between 
several unions and companies. 
5. The proposed clause does not tend to undercut the union's 
status as bargaining agent. While Congress rejected a proposed 
general requirement for a pre-strike vote on the employer's last 
offer among all employees in a bargaining unit, it adopted such 
a requirement as to "national emergency" disputes, and directed 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to attempt to 
secure agreement on such a vote, in seeking to settle disputes 
generally. 
The Borg-Warner case was decided on May 5, 1958. Mean-
while, the Board, on' March 4, 1958, had decided Economy 
Stores, Inc.64 During negotiations, the employer proposed a clause 
64120 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1958). 
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to indemnify it against damage caused by any future violation 
of the proposed agreement. The union objected, but proceeded 
to bargain on the demand, suggesting alternative clauses. Follow-
ing an impasse, the union filed section 8(a)(5) charges. The Gen-
eral Counsel issued a complaint on the theory that the clause 
demanded did not relate to a statutory subject of bargaining, 
hence the employer had no right to insist on its proposal to the 
point of an impasse. The Board dismissed this aspect of the 
complaint. Members Rodgers and Jenkins found it unnecessary to 
pass on the issue raised by the General Counsel, reasoning that 
the union, by negotiating on the employer's proposal, had ren-
dered the issue moot. If this reasoning is accepted, the danger 
pointed out by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Borg-Warner, is 
increased. Thus, in a Borg-Warner situation, one party will be 
reluctant to propose a non-statutory subject for fear of a section 
8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) violation if it should press its proposal too far. 
In an Economy Stores situation the other party will be reluctant 
even to discuss such a proposal for fear of being held later to have 
waived its right to object to the proposal as a condition of 
agreement. 
Chairman Leedom and Member Bean pursued a different 
line of reasoning. In their view, since the Supreme Court decision 
in American National Insurance Co., any demand advanced in 
ordinary good faith may be pressed to the point of impasse. As 
they saw the facts, the employer had made his proposal because 
of repeated contract violations by sister locals operating in the 
same community. Statements by the particular local that it had 
"ways and means of getting things it wanted," could therefore 
reasonably be interpreted as a threat by this local likewise to 
dishonor any contract which was not to its liking. The employer 
thus had a reasonable justification for his demands, which supplied 
the basis for a finding of good faith. 
The suggested test of reasonable justification, which would 
permit a party to press even a non-statutory demand to the point 
of impasse, would seem to conform to the basic principle of sub-
jective good faith as the touchstone of the duty to bargain. How-
ever, on July 10, 1958, following the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Borg-Warn'er, the Board issued its decision in North 
Carolina Furniture, 65 in which it reverted to its original per se 
65121 NL.R.B. No. 8 (1958). 
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view. In that case, the employer insisted on a clause which would 
subject the assets of the international union to damages for breach 
of contract by the local, the certified representative. The em-
ployer sought to justify his position on the ground that the 
local had no assets and the international benefited from the 
contract by the receipt of dues. The Board did not attempt to 
appraise the asserted justification and held the employer in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5), on the ground that the proposed clause 
did not relate to a statutory subject of bargaining. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been to review the policy-making 
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board in seeking to 
effectuate the duty "to bargain collectively" under the National 
Labor Relations Act, in order to ascertain and appraise their 
direction. 
The Board's task has not been an enviable one. It has been 
complicated by vague and sometimes contradictory directives 
by Congress and the courts, by conflicting pressures from labor, 
management and the general public, by numerous changes in the 
Board's personnel, and by a drastic shift in congressional policy 
reflected in the 1947 amendments to the act. Under the circum-
stances, it is remarkable that the Board has been able to maintain 
any consistency in its own views. 
The basic objective of Congress in adopting the act was to 
promote industrial peace and to foster stable labor-management 
relations through the process of collective bargaining. Congress 
had in mind "the philosophy of collective bargaining as worked 
out in the labor movement in the United States."66 In laying 
down the statutory framework, however, Congress departed from 
that philosophy in important respects.67 In some instances it 
adopted rules inconsistent with its basic objective; in others, 
rules inconsistent in themselves. Thus, while recognizing labor-
management cooperation as essential to stable and peaceful rela-
tions, Congress limited such cooperation by making it illegal 
for employers to cooperate with unions by any means which 
might tend to "encourage" union membership; 68 at the same 
66 Note IO supra. 
67 See p. 809 supra. 
68 LMRA, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3), makes it an unfair 
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time, it sanctioned agreements tending to require union mem-
bership, in order to remove a prime source of unrest in organized 
plants.69 
Aside from such initial difficulties, the task of the Board has 
been complicated by the process of judicial review which has 
inevitably resulted in conflicts of decision among the courts 
of appeals and divisions of opinion within the Supreme Court 
itself, as to the meaning of the collective bargaining process 
and the Board's function in relation thereto. The Board's task 
has been further complicated by the pressures of labor and 
management in particular cases, with little or no regard to 
consistency or to long-range objectives. Finally, the Board has 
been subjected to the vicissitudes of public opinion which seems 
to demand a "hands off" policy and at the same time that the 
government "do something" about union power and inflationary 
wage settlements.70 
In its early days, the Board conceived of its function in simple 
terms, namely, to insure the establishment of collective bar-
gaining. It likewise defined good faith bargaining in simple 
terms. "The essential thing," it said, is "the serious intent to 
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground."71 
Soon, however, the Board began to concern itself with protecting 
the collective bargaining process, and to condemn as a refusal 
to bargain conduct which in its judgment "impaired" that 
process. In applying this concept, it. condemned certain types of 
conduct as illegal per se. More recently, this concept has been 
held to require, according to Truitt, "honest claims"; according 
to Phelps-Dodge, Personal Products, and Boone County Coal 
Corp., "fair dealing" and "reasoned discussion in a background 
of balanced bargaining relations"; either party failing to meet 
labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to ... any ... condition of 
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization .... " See 
Radio Officers' Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). 
69 LMRA, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140-141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3). 
70 Compare the following: "The committee bill is predicated upon our belief that 
a fair and equitable labor policy can best be achieved by ... free collective bargaining. 
Government decisions should not be substituted for free agreement. . . ." [remarks of 
Senator Taft, at 2, S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)]. "I say to my colleagues that 
such action [a union's insistence on a considerable wage increase under threat of strike] 
is not collective bargaining." [remarks of Senator Ellender, 93 CONG. REc. 4135 (1947)]. 
71 NLRB FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 84-86 (1936). 
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those standards is deemed to be guilty of an "abuse of . . . 
bargaining powers. ''72 
The requirement of "reasoned discussion" is simply the 
counterpart of the prohibition against a "take it or leave it" 
attitude. What is troublesome is the broad requirement of 
"honest claims" and "fair dealing" in a background of "balanced 
bargaining relations." Does honesty mean subjective honesty, or 
honesty according to the observance of reasonable standards, and 
if the latter, by what test of "reasonable?"73 In Truitt, the em-
ployer's claim of inability to pay was held to be dishonest, be-
cause he failed to produce supporting evidence, although there 
was no finding that the claim did not represent his honest judg-
ment. Again, what is the criterion for determining "fair deal-
ing?" In Phelps-Dodge, Personal Products, and Boone County 
Coal, the unions were held to have refused to bargain because 
their tactics were deemed improper, although Congress had de-
liberately refrained from condemning such tactics as illegal. 
Perhaps the most troublesome is the suggested requirement 
of discussion in a background of "balanced bargaining rela-
tions." In the recent Buffalo Linen Supply case,74 the Supreme 
Court applied a similar concept in finding that a lockout by mem-
bers of an employer's association, as a counter-measure against a 
strike against one of its members, was a privileged interference 
with an otherwise protected concerted activity. In the court's 
view, the Board could properly strike a balance ". . . between 
the right to strike and the interest of small employers in 
pursuing multi-employer bargaining as a means of bargaining 
on an equal basis with a large union .... "75 The court stated 
that the "ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting 
legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to 
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate 
72 Tex.tile Workers Union of America, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 at 746, enforced in 
part, set aside in part (D.C. Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 409. 
73 Compare Justice Frankfurter's suggestion in the Borg-Warner case, 356 U.S. 342 
at 351 (1958), that any collective ·bargaining proposal may be pressed to an impasse if 
it is not "so clearly outside the reasonable range of industrial bargaining as to establish 
a refusal to bargain in good faith." As a long-time student of labor-management relations 
Justice Frankfurter was apparently concerned with preserving the flexible character of 
collective ,bargaining. Presumably he would have the Board develop and apply the test 
of reasonableness, subject to judicial review. 
74 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). 
75 Id. at 96. 
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responsibility, which Congress committed primarily to the . . . 
Board, subject to limited judicial review."76 In that case, how-
ever, the union was not charged with refusal to bargain for 
exercising its superior economic strength against the struck em-
ployer. Is there a difference? Justice Harlan, who concurred in 
Buffalo Linen Supply Co., evidently thought so, judging by his 
dissent in Borg-Warner, involving a charge of employer refusal 
to bargain. In that dissent, he stated: "If one thing is clear, it is 
that the Board was not viewed by Congress as an agency which 
should exercise its powers to aid a party to collective bargain-
ing which was in an economically disadvantageous position."77 
The Board's reference to "balanced bargaining relations" in the 
context of a refusal to bargain charge, if meant to contradict 
this principle, is surely cause for concern. If a strong union is 
guilty of a refusal to bargain because it has "abused its bar-
gaining powers" in striking a weak employer for an "excessive" 
wage increase, for example, then a strong employer must be 
found likewise guilty, for the same reason, in saying "no" to 
a weak union which has requested a "reasonable" wage increase. 
Either result would clearly violate the fundamental principle 
that "the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel 
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive 
terms of collective bargaining agreements."78 
The temptation to aid the weak against the strong is under-
standable. But in the complex field of labor-management disputes, 
such questions as the tactics which may be used or the extent 
to which a party may exercise its superior economic strength 
to secure an advantage in the bargaining process, involve delicate 
policy judgments. There is support in the language of the 
Supreme Court opinions to justify the Board's exercising such a 
judgment in seeking to "protect" the collective bargaining 
process.79 There is even support in the legislative history for at-
tempting to insure "balanced bargaining relations."80 
The immediate problem is not, however, one of authority but 
the necessity or wisdom of its exercise. Perhaps the Board is aware 
of the problem, judging by its recent statement that "our duty 
76 Ibid. 
77 356 U.S. 342 at 358 (1958). 
78 American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 at 404 (1952). 
79 See the Heinz case, 311 U.S. 514 (1941). 
80 See note 70 supra. 
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under the Act is ... to determine whether the obligation of good 
faith bargaining has been met rather than to establish ideal bar-
gaining conditions."81 The question is whether by this statement 
the Board was merely defending the course on which it had em-
barked in Truitt, Phelps-Dodge, and Personal Products, or 
announcing a return to its original ·concept of the duty to bargain 
in good faith as simply "the serious intent to adjust differences 
and to reach an acceptable common ground."82 
81 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., ll8 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1957). 
82 NLRB FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 84-86 (1936). 
